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This paper investigates whether CEO supplemental executive retirement plans 
(SERPs) are associated with firm risk. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that CEOs 
manage their firms more conservatively as their debt incentives increase. Using new 
executive compensation disclosures mandated by the SEC, I find a negative association 
between CEO SERPs and firm risk but only for unsheltered SERPs. I find that when a 
CEO SERP is protected by a lump sum payment or by a trust (i.e. sheltered), the negative 
association between SERPs and firm risk is greatly diminished and even eliminated in 
some models. Furthermore, I show that having a greater proportion of outside CEOs on a 
compensation committee when a new CEO is hired is associated with a higher likelihood 
of the new CEO having a SERP. These findings have implications for the method in 
which executives are compensated with retirement pay and address the SEC’s growing 
concern about the link between compensation and firm risk management practices.  
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In recent years, the media and academics have paid more attention to 
compensation received by CEOs after they have exited the firm. This post-employment 
pay is often composed of various pay forms including supplemental executive retirement 
plans (SERP), severance packages, deferred compensation, and other perquisites.1 Many 
“retirement packages” have made headlines both in good economic climates and bad. For 
example, the media reported that former Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil Lee 
Raymond received a retirement package estimated to be worth close to $400 million 
subsequent to his retirement in 2005 (Mouawad 2006). The entire $400 million was not 
completely related to his retirement; however, he did receive a $98 million lump sum 
payment of his pension when he retired (SEC 2006). More recently, the CEO of Bank of 
America Ken Lewis announced his plans to step down at the end of 2009. According to 
the Wall Street Journal, his retirement package is currently worth $69.7 million 
(Fitzpatrick and Solomon 2009). Public pressure to limit CEO pay has increased, 
especially in light of recent bonuses received by executives at failing banks. The US 
Treasury ordered Ken Lewis to forego his salary and bonus for 2009 in part due to the 
magnitude of his retirement package.2  
                                                 
1 Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs) are defined benefit pension plans granted to 
executives. They are termed “supplemental” because they exceed the amounts covered by ERISA 
regulations. See section (2) for further explanation. 
2 Although Bank of America received TARP funds, the Treasury cannot access retirement packages 




The SEC has continued to increase disclosures surrounding executive 
compensation. The SEC’s objective is not only to increase the disclosure of monetary 
amounts but require qualitative disclosures addressing compensation strategies and goals. 
These disclosures most often made in annual proxy filings provide a link between firm 
benchmarks or objectives and executive compensation methods. In December 2009 the 
SEC issued a release discussing enhanced disclosures concerning risk, compensation, and 
corporate governance (SEC 2009). The intent of the new disclosures is to provide users 
of this information not only with the context of compensation as it relates to company 
financial performance but also compensation and its affect on firm risk. The SEC outlines 
several specific objectives in the release including disclosures about “The relationship of 
a company’s compensation policies and practices to risk management” as well as “Board 
leadership structure and the board’s role in risk oversight.” 
The disclosures reflect growing concern about excessive risk-taking by executives 
and its impact on the various stakeholders of the firm. If compensation structures affect 
management choices and these choices affect firm characteristics, then firms and 
stakeholders must have an understanding of how CEO compensation structures impact 
firm risk. In particular, what affect do CEO SERPs have on firm risk? My study 
addresses this question. 
 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) provide one of the first empirical studies 
examining compensation owed to the CEO subsequent to service. They refer to these 
payments using Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) term “inside debt”. In effect, when a CEO 
has a defined benefit pension the executive is like a debt holder against the firm. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that a firm can eliminate most of the agency costs of debt 
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by having the manager hold an equal portion of debt and equity. This would eliminate 
incentive to shift wealth from debt holders to stock holders. My paper extends this 
research by considering the probability that the debt holders (CEOs) will actually receive 
the full payment.  Not all categories of debt are granted with the same rights. I investigate 
the differences in the debt (SERPs) granted to CEOs. Based on evidence presented in my 
paper, CEO SERPs have varying characteristics beyond size. These varying 
characteristics elicit different CEO choices that affect firm risk. Specifically, I find that in 
general SERPs are negatively associated with measures of firm risk. However, I also find 
that when the SERP payments are sheltered through an alternative payment form or trust, 
the negative association between SERPs and risk is attenuated. These findings indicate 
that not all inside debt has the same incentive effect. These findings also suggest that 
SERPs or other forms of inside debt only serve to reduce agency costs when they share 
structures similar to debt instruments (i.e. long term payments as opposed to lump sum or 
sheltered payments). 
Because many of the SERPs are paid after retirement as life annuities, it is in the 
CEO’s best interest to conservatively manage the firm so that the firm is healthy and the 
necessary cash exists to pay the SERP. While some argue that this form of payment is 
excessive and unrelated to performance, it does seem to encourage the CEO to consider 
the long term performance of the firm and operate with the interest of debt holders in 
mind. On the other hand, CEOs without SERPs may aggressively attempt to maximize 
the equity values of the firm to maximize their personal wealth. Traditionally, this 
aggressive behavior has been viewed as a benefit to shareholders. It seems that it is more 
common now for shareholders and regulators to question this aggressive behavior and 
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place more concern on the health of the firm in the long run. New SEC regulations 
require firms to explain the link between compensation and firm risk (SEC 2009). It is 
critical for companies, regulators, and investors to understand not only the impact of 
SERPs on firm risk but the impact of specific SERP characteristics. 
Executive compensation has been a topic of study for corporate governance 
researchers in many different academic areas. The relation between pay and performance 
has attracted many researchers since Jensen and Meckling (1976) wrote about the 
implications and Jensen (1993) expressed his concerns about the shortcomings of CEO 
compensation. The research is only beginning to investigate the implications of post-
employment pay. While this is not the first paper to investigate post-employment pay for 
CEOs, it is one of the first to investigate specific characteristics of SERPs using the 
newly mandated disclosures.  
My study contributes to the literature by examining SERP magnitudes and 
characteristics and assessing their impact on firm risk. By identifying specific 
characteristics of SERPs and testing their associations with risk, I am able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of using this form of pay to reduce agency costs. The decisions and 
structures that led to the recent recession have caused regulators and investors to not only 
consider firm profitability but risk as well. If investors and regulators better understand 
the sources and incentives of firm risk, they can properly evaluate compensation 
packages. 
In the second set of hypotheses outlined in this paper I make predictions 
concerning the likelihood of a CEO receiving a SERP based on corporate governance 
characteristics of the firm. It is also critical for stakeholders in the firm to not only 
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understand the association between SERPs and firm risk but the determinants of SERPs. I 
investigate compensation committee characteristics as well as other internal corporate 
governance characteristics and find evidence that having a higher percentage of CEOs 
serving on a firm’s compensation committee increases the likelihood that the firm’s CEO 
will have a SERP. This has implications for investors who wish to have a say on pay 
within the firm. Investors do not directly set CEO pay policies, but they can play an 
active role in determining the board structure of a firm. Understanding the influence that 
outside CEOs who sit on the board have on the compensation of a firm’s CEO is 
important. 
The next section contains a discussion of Agency Theory and its relation to 
SERPs as well as a brief background on the structure of SERPs. The following two 
sections develop the hypotheses concerning SERPs and firm risk followed by the 
hypotheses concerning the determinants of a SERP. The fifth section of paper contains 






        
  
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) discussion of agency costs they address the costs 
that arise from a CEO only holding equity in the firm. This scenario aligns CEO interests 
with the interests of the shareholders by incentivizing the CEO to manage the firm with 
the stockholders in mind. By aligning the investment policy of the firm with the interest 
of the stockholders, this may redistribute wealth between debt holders and stockholders. 
Jensen and Meckling suggest that if the CEO were bound to hold a fraction of total debt 
that equaled the fraction of equity that he or she held then there would no longer be any 
incentive to redistribute wealth from debt holders to stockholders. 
Corporations have not required CEOs to invest in debt instruments used by the 
firm; however, firms may use certain forms of compensation (referred to as inside debt) 
such as SERPs as a “debt-like” instrument to align CEO incentives with those of debt 
holders. If SERPs are structured as long term agreements for the CEO to receive an 
annuity stream in the future, then these plans are very similar to debt (i.e. the company 
owes the CEO payments in the future just as the firm owes bondholders payments in the 
future). If the SERP annuity is subject to forfeiture in the event of bankruptcy then the 
CEO will revise investment policy to ensure the stability of the firm. Jensen and 
Meckling would argue that these future payments would align CEO incentives with debt 
holders and reduce agency costs because there would be no threat of a redistribution of 
wealth between debt holders and stockholders. This appears to be an important 
mechanism for reducing agency costs and incentivizing a long-term focus as opposed to a 
quarter to quarter focus. 
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Sundram and Yermack (2007) provide evidence that inside debt does change 
CEO incentives and reduce agency costs. They argue that when a CEO holds only equity, 
he or she has incentive to tolerate excessive risk. The authors analyze firms from the S&P 
500 from 1996-2002 and find that when a CEO’s personal debt to equity ratio exceeds 
that of the firm’s, then he or she manages more conservatively. Granting large SERPs 
encourages executives to manage conservatively in order to protect the future payments. 
The authors also find that CEOs are much more likely to retire once their pensions 
become fully payable. This paper is one of the first empirical papers to provide evidence 
of post-employment pay altering CEO behavior. 
Kalyta (2009) measures the relation between retiring CEO pensions and abnormal 
accruals. Using a sample of 388 Fortune 1000 CEOs, he finds that retiring CEOs are 
more likely to manage earnings upward in the years immediately preceding retirement 
when the value of the SERP is impacted by performance. He does not find this result for 
SERPs that do not have a performance component. This is a unique finding that suggests 
not all SERPs are identical and that unique characteristics can change behavior. While the 
inside debt theory presented by Jensen and Meckling is supported empirically, what 
qualifies as inside debt may depend on the structure of the compensation. The structure of 
the SERP may have implications for the effectiveness of this form of compensation 
serving its purpose to reduce agency costs.  
SERP Structure 
 
My paper investigates differing characteristics of SERPs. First, I provide a 
background on the basic structure of SERPs. Companies may offer two primary types of 
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retirement plans to their executives – qualified and/or non-qualified plans.3 Qualified 
plans are regulated by ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. These plans are offered to 
most employees within a company and offer certain tax advantages. These plans are 
regulated by ERISA to provide protection of deferred compensation and fringe benefits 
for common employees (Kennedy 2002). Although not intended to safeguard the interests 
of executives, CEOs can participate in the programs as long as they follow the 
regulations. In order for CEOs to participate, the total level of retirement funds 
contributed to the plan cannot exceed regulated amounts. Because these amounts are 
somewhat limited in terms of CEO compensation, many companies have structured 
nonqualified executive compensation plans also known as supplemental executive 
retirement plans (SERPs).  
 A SERP does not receive the preferential tax treatment enjoyed by the qualified 
plans. However, there is no limit as to the amount that may be accumulated within the 
SERP. Under a qualified plan, an employee does not incur any tax liability for “receiving 
a vested and funded right to receive deferred compensation”, and the employer gets a tax 
deduction for making a contribution to the trust (Kennedy 2002). Furthermore, these 
amounts are generally protected in the event of bankruptcy. Under a nonqualified plan or 
SERP, the employee does not incur a tax liability for the amounts contributed to the 
SERP, but the employer does not receive a tax deduction until distribution. Once the cash 
is distributed, the employee is taxed on the distributed amount. However, all deferred 
amounts must be unavailable to the employee or subject to “substantial risk of loss or 
                                                 




forfeiture”, otherwise the amounts become immediately taxable (Kennedy 2002). This is 
important for one primary reason as it relates to my study; SERPs must remain unfunded 
if the CEO wishes to avoid an immediate tax liability for the SERP. If amounts are set 
aside for payment to the CEO and not available to general creditors, then the SERP 
amounts may become taxable (Kennedy 2002; Clark and Forman 2004). 
Prior literature in this area has been based on estimated SERP values due to 
limited disclosures. The SEC crafted new executive compensation disclosure regulations 
that became effective in 2007. The new regulations have significantly increased the 
nature and amount of data available to the public concerning executive compensation. 
Among many changes, the SEC now requires specific disclosures concerning executive 
retirement/pension agreements and severance agreements. These disclosures not only 
include negotiated amounts but the events that would trigger payment by the company.  
The current body of research concerning retirement packages in the law, finance, 
management, and accounting literatures finds that SERPs are common although not 
universal for all firms. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) find that 68% of the CEOs in their 
sample participated in a company sponsored pension plan. These plans had an estimated 
median actuarial net present value of $15 million ranging from a minimum of $3.3 
million to a maximum of $73.3 million. Their research also indicates that the average 
CEO retirement package represents a very significant amount of an executive’s lifetime 
pay – 35% (median) in their sample. Some research attempts to provide evidence in 
support of various compensation theories that provide determinants for the agreements. 
Very little research investigates the impact of these agreements on firm outcomes such as 
performance or risk.  
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Currently, the few papers in this area have only estimated SERP magnitudes. 
Furthermore, samples have been formed by searching for CEOs who have already exited 
the firm. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) study a sample of CEOs who departed office 
during 2003 and 2004. They gathered information on total compensation and retirement 
pay from SEC filings and calculated estimated pension values. The authors conclude that 
SERPs have very little impact on performance during the tenure of the CEO. They argue 
that retirement pay does not affect performance because most of the retirement packages 
analyzed are a function of salary, not performance. Because pensions serve as a “salary-
like” payment, the authors conclude that these pay packages have no impact on 
performance. The paper provides an excellent descriptive background of SERPs; 
however, the conclusions were reached based on compensation theory, not empirical 
testing.  
One of the first empirical papers to investigate SERPs is Gerakos (2007). He 
investigates pensions to determine whether they are a function of managerial rent 
extraction or optimal contracting between boards of directors and CEOs and to determine 
the effectiveness of the 2007 SEC disclosures. He has a unique proprietary data set of 172 
publicly traded firms as well as a data set consisting of S&P 500 firms. The proprietary 
data set was generated by a compensation consultant who surveyed companies and the 
retirement packages provided to executives. Gerakos finds the strongest evidence that 
optimal contracting determines the pension practices of large corporations, but he does 
find some support for the managerial power hypothesis. If the CEO is exercising undue 
influence over the firm then this suggests the need for an understanding of the 
governance structure surrounding these practices. He also predicts that the changes to the 
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disclosures regarding pensions in 2007 will have little impact on investors, because most 
of the needed information can be surmised from present disclosures. Wei and Yermack 
(2009) test stockholder and bondholder reactions subsequent to the disclosures in 2007 
and find that markets did react significantly to the disclosures, counter to Gerakos (2007) 
expectations. 
 It is important to understand the structure of the SERP including the various tax 
regulations applicable to this form of compensation. Based on the brief description of the 
tax laws and some of the prior research, it is evident that SERPs can be arranged in 
various forms. Not only can the funding status vary from CEO to CEO but the payment 
options vary. Some SERPs are paid out over the course of retirement as an annuity and 
some are paid in a lump sum. These varying characteristics have not thoroughly been 
investigated in the literature in part due to the limited disclosures prior to 2007. Most of 
the models in prior research focuses on the amount of the SERP alone (Bebchuk and 
Jackson 2005; Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Accounting for the nuances of each SERP 




FIRM RISK HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory offers an alternative explanation to expected utility theory for 
individual decision making. Consider an individual’s choice given alternative options 
varying in risk. Often this is expressed as a lottery supplying different payouts based on a 
risky choice verses a safe choice. The choice could also consist of multiple alternatives 
with varying degrees of probabilities. In a risk neutral setting an individual will choose 
the option with the highest expected value. The choice will differ once risk aversion is 
introduced into the setting (Ross 2004; Carlson and Lazrak 2009). A risk averse 
individual seeks to maximize personal utility as opposed to choosing the option that 
results in the highest expected value (Davis and Holt 1993). However, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) find that “individuals tend to underweight outcomes that are merely 
probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty” – the certainty 
effect of prospect theory.  
CEO Decision Making 
 CEOs with SERPs have wealth that is promised to them with certainty as long as 
the firm does not enter bankruptcy. These CEOs still have equity in the firm, but the 
value of this equity largely depends on the performance of the firm as a result of 
investment choices by the CEO. Prospect theory predicts that these CEOs will 
underweight the outcomes associated with the equity and overweight the certainty of the 
SERP. That is to say that CEOs will act to manage the firm conservatively for the 
certainty of a large SERP even if that results in not maximizing the value of their own 
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equity holdings. For example, a CEO may have the opportunity to invest in two different 
projects that are mutually exclusive. If one is a risky project with a range of payoffs and 
the other a safe project with a range of payoffs, the incentive compensation is designed to 
incentivize the CEO to make the most profitable decision for shareholders. While the 
majority of executive compensation literature has examined CEO behavior related to pay 
received during his or her tenure, more recent research indicates that retirement pay may 
impact decision making as well (Bebchuk and Jackson 2005, Inderst and Mueller 2006, 
Sundaram and Yermack 2007, and Gerakos 2007). These papers have provided evidence 
that compensation contracted to be received subsequent to service could affect behavior 
during service. The decision concerning two mutually exclusive projects with varying 
payoff probabilities is now being made by an executive who not only has current cash 
and incentive pay but perhaps a large retirement package. 
 In general, a SERP is an unfunded, unguaranteed annuity to be paid throughout 
retirement. Because the amount is unfunded and unguaranteed, the SERP payments are 
subject to the performance of the firm at the time of the CEOs retirement as well as future 
performance under a new CEO. One obvious detriment to payment would be the firm 
entering bankruptcy. If this occurred, the CEO would lose all right to the SERP. For this 
reason, it is in the best interest of the CEO to conserve cash and work to leave the 
company in the safest financial condition possible. This maximizes the probability of full 
payment of the SERP amount. 
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As previously mentioned, prior research finds a positive association between CEO 
personal debt-to-equity ratios and distance from default.4 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) 
measure firm distance from bankruptcy as a proxy for firm risk. Their results indicate that 
CEOs manage conservatively when their personal debt to equity ratios exceed their firm’s 
debt to equity ratio. I employ standard measures of risk (beta and standard deviation of 
returns) and test the direct impact of SERPs on risk regardless of the CEO’s personal debt 
to equity ratio. The relation between standard firm risk measures and SERPs has not been 
investigated. Because CEOs will want to ensure payment of their SERP, they will choose 
to manage the firm conservatively. This effect should increase as the size of the SERP 
increases. As such, I would expect that there exist a negative relation between the size of 
the CEO’s SERP and firm risk. 
H1: CEO SERP values are negatively associated with firm risk.  
Research has been mixed concerning the proper balance of performance sensitive 
pay and cash. While some studies find evidence in favor of the incentive effect of 
performance-based pay, other studies have found evidence supporting a risk aversion 
effect. Mehran (1995) and Mishra et al. (2000) both find a positive correlation between 
performance sensitive pay and firm value. Brick et al. (2008) and Carlson and Lazrak 
(2009) both show in their settings that increasing performance pay decreases future 
volatility. Risk-averse managers decrease overall firm risk in order to safeguard their pay. 
The authors conclude that the risk-aversion effect dominates the incentive effect because 
the manager’s compensation is exposed to more risk. Although intuitively it seems that 
                                                 
4 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) define the CEO personal debt to equity ratio as compensation owed to the 
CEO by the firm subsequent to service (debt) divided by equity compensation (stock and options). 
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larger SERPs are associated with less risk, large SERPs that are relatively sheltered (i.e. 
protected by a trust or lump-sum payment) may encourage different risk taking behavior 
than less secure SERPs5. 
 Given the updated SEC disclosures beginning in 2007, researchers are now able 
to gather more informative data concerning the structure of the CEO compensation 
agreements and retirement packages in particular. One unique characteristic of the SERP 
that varies among firms is the payment option. Some firms require that the CEO receive 
the value of their pension in the form of an annuity throughout retirement. Other firms 
require the CEO to receive the value of the pension in a lump sum. And alternatively 
some CEOs are given the option of a lump sum or installments. There is also evidence 
that some CEOs have “SERP Swaps” or “Secular Trusts” that guarantee payment of the 
obligation (Bebchuk and Jackson 2005, Sundaram and Yermack 2007). The differing 
characteristics of retirement packages vary not only in form but also in probability of 
payment. A CEO who has the option to take a lump sum at retirement has a higher 
probability that he or she will actually receive the funds as opposed to the CEO who 
receives his or her payments over the remainder of their life. Not only are the funds 
immediately available for personal use with a lump sum payment, they are not subject to 
future firm performance primarily controlled by a new CEO. If the majority of CEO 
SERPs are subject to creditors in the event of bankruptcy, then it behooves CEOs to 
conservatively manage the firm to protect their retirement, even at the cost of sacrificing 
wealth that might have been accumulated on stock and option values. On the other hand, 
the CEO with the lump sum option receives his or her payment quickly upon retirement 
                                                 
5 See Appendix A for a discussion of ways that a SERP may be “sheltered” through the formation of a trust. 
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and may be less concerned about conservatively managing the firm to avoid bankruptcy 
or loss. He or she does not have to worry about future firm performance, has much 
greater control over the profitability and liquidity of the firm at the time that the benefit is 
paid; therefore, he or she is able to take risks to maximize personal stock and option 
values knowing that the SERP is relatively safe.6 This is expressed in the second 
hypothesis. 
H2: The negative association between CEO SERP values and firm risk is 
attenuated when the SERP is sheltered.7  
The 2007 disclosures also provide greater insight into negotiated severance 
agreements for executives. Severance agreements also have a potential impact on the 
decision making of CEOs, especially when combined with a large SERP agreement. 
Yermack (2006) investigates these agreements and finds evidence that 50% of his sample 
receive a severance payout upon voluntary or involuntary termination. He finds that most 
of the involuntary packages are larger than the voluntary and concludes that these 
packages serve as an ex post settling up mechanism. Rau and Xu (2008) perform a 
similar study with a larger sample and apply various executive compensation theories – 
risk compensation, incentive tradeoff, rent extraction, and boilerplate. Most of their 
findings are consistent with the risk compensation theory. CEOs incur professional 
                                                 
6 In theory it could be possible for CEOs to sell their rights to future pension payments in return for a lump 
sum distribution through a guaranteed insurance contract (GIC). However, the discount rate that would be 
applied to this transaction would likely be very large given the risk that the insurer now faces and the 
increased information asymmetry between the insurer and company as compared to the CEO and company. 
Furthermore, I have had a discussion with an executive at a Fortune 500 firm who was part of the 
company’s SERP, and he indicated that on only one occasion had he heard of a fellow executive try to 
exchange future payments for a lump sum payment. He said that the negotiated discount rate that was to be 
applied was so large that the executive chose not to enter the transaction.  
7 SERP payments are defined as sheltered if the payment method is a lump sum or the CEO has a lump sum 
option. The payments are also sheltered if they are protected by a trust or “SERP swap”. 
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reputation risk when joining a firm. The magnitude of this risk may depend on the risk of 
the firm. Rau and Xu’s findings indicate that the size of the severance package is 
correlated with firm risk. They also find that firms with strong corporate governance have 
change in control clauses as part of the severance agreements that encourage CEOs to 
seek out positive merger opportunities. Inderst and Mueller (2005) draw similar 
conclusions in their theoretical investigation of severance agreements. Their study shows 
that these agreements can be used to incentivize the CEO to share (rather than hide) bad 
news and even exit the firm if it is in the best interest of shareholders. Severance 
agreements may provide differing incentives based on their structure but nonetheless 
affect CEO risk tolerance and should not be ignored in an analysis of decision making. 
Hypothesis two predicts that the additional security of a formal severance agreement 
combined with a SERP will encourage greater risk taking by the CEO. SERP agreements 
generally define a “normal retirement age” or length of service required in order to 
receive the full estimated benefit. In the event that a CEO chooses to retire, leave the firm 
early, or is dismissed, the estimated SERP benefit is adjusted down to reflect fewer years 
of service. (The SERP may also be adjusted up in the event that the CEO chooses to 
remain in his or her position beyond the “normal retirement age”.) While having a 
severance agreement will not generally affect the calculation of the SERP or any 
adjustments due to length of service, a severance agreement may provide additional 
security in the event that the CEO departs early and the SERP benefit is adjusted down. 
The overall wealth for a CEO who departs early will be higher if a negotiated severance 
agreement exists. This difference in overall wealth may have an impact on decisions 
made during the CEO’s tenure. The severance agreement may provide the CEO 
 
 18
opportunity to increase risk in an attempt to maximize stock and option values. If the 
company does not prosper and chooses to remove the CEO, then a CEO with a severance 
agreement and SERP will be in a much better financial position than one who does not 
receive severance and has his or her SERP adjusted down.  
H3: The negative association between CEO SERP values and firm risk is 






DETERMINANTS OF SERPS HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In another stream of research there are a growing number of papers seeking to 
evaluate compensation committee quality or effectiveness. Compensation committee 
quality has been a challenging variable to measure primarily because research has not 
clearly defined a set of effective characteristics. The next section of this study measures 
those characteristics that are correlated with CEOs receiving SERPs. Combined with 
what is learned from the previous hypotheses of the paper, this section may provide 
evidence of associations between compensation committee structure and firm risk. 
 Researchers that have studied compensation committees have at times failed to 
find an association between standard corporate governance measures and CEO 
compensation. Independence of committee members and CEO involvement are two 
examples of variables that have had a significant impact on board and committee 
effectiveness in other literatures, but the association is not as strong for compensation 
committee studies. Tests for association between CEO pay and various governance 
measures may fail to find results when the incorrect attribute of CEO compensation is 
analyzed. Although some association has been found between governance measures and 
salary and/or options, these studies were not able to look for an association between 
governance measures and other forms of CEO compensation such as SERPs. This study 
will extend this research by testing the association between previously examined 
governance variables and CEO SERPs.  
Brick et al. (2006) find evidence that excess director compensation leads to excess 
CEO compensation. There is also growing evidence in the audit committee literature that 
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audit committee member incentives affect decision making. Archambeault et al. (2008) 
find a significant positive relation between accounting restatements and audit committee 
members receiving short-term stock option grants. The result does not hold for audit 
committee members receiving long-term stock option grants. Bierstaker et al. (2009) find 
similar benefits to compensating audit committee members with long-term incentives. 
Specifically, audit committee members compensated with long-term incentives are more 
likely to support the auditor in a dispute with management. These papers provide 
evidence that directors may act differently based on their own compensation. As research 
continues to grow in the area of CEO retirement packages and the effect on firm 
performance, it will be important to understand the types of compensation committees 
that are associated with these packages. Because the prior literature suggests that CEO 
SERPs are large cash sums that are generally not very sensitive to performance, I expect 
directors with large annual retainers, not sensitive to performance, to be more likely to 
grant large SERPs.   
H4: The size of the compensation committees’ annual retainers will have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of the CEO having a SERP. 
Other studies have investigated the impact that director stock ownership has on 
CEO pay (Conyon and He 2004, Sun et al. 2009). Director ownership of the firm could 
have two potential effects. With directors interests more closely aligned with shareholder 
interests, directors may increase monitoring efforts. Conyon and He (2004) find that the 
level of director ownership and the level CEO compensation are inversely related. This 
finding suggests that directors who are also owners of the firm may choose to lower the 
overall level of CEO compensation. Directors may also choose to structure CEO 
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compensation in a way that increases pay-performance sensitivity. Sun et al. (2009) show 
that increased compensation committee quality is associated with a more sensitive pay-
performance link. Based on compensation committee members beliefs concerning the 
incentive effect of SERPs, members with stock ownership may be less likely to grant 
SERPs if they believe this will weaken the pay-performance link. Alternatively, if 
directors believe that providing a SERP for the CEO will reduce overall firm risk then 
they may grant SERPs in order to protect their equity ownership from short-term 
volatility. The previous research in this area shows that directors with equity ownership 
behave differently than those without. However, it is unclear if directors will be more 
likely or less likely to grant a SERP if they have equity ownership. The following non-
directional hypothesis will be tested. 
H5: The equity ownership of the compensation committee members will have an 
impact on the likelihood of the CEO having a SERP. 
The presence of CEOs on compensation committees is another characteristic that 
has received attention in the literature. Conyon and He (2004), Anderson and Bizjak 
(2003), Daily et al. (1998), and Sun et al. (2009) have all investigated the impact that 
having a CEO on the compensation committee has on CEO pay. Most researchers’ 
intuition suggests that having a CEO on the compensation committee will lead to higher 
pay for that firm’s CEO. After all, this is a relatively small network of individuals that is 
often thought of as having a sort of fraternal relationship. However, there is very little 
evidence supporting this intuition.  The majority of evidence indicates that having a CEO 
on the compensation committee has no real effect on the level of compensation. While 
salaries, bonuses, and options may not reflect the influence of CEOs on compensation 
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committees, retirement plans may. SERP arrangements have historically been subject to 
less disclosure than other forms of CEO compensation. For this reason, CEOs may know 
that post-employment pay will be less scrutinized than other forms. Prior research 
indicates that a slight majority of CEOs have SERP arrangements (Bebchuk and Jackson 
2005, Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Perhaps based on the common occurrence of these 
packages within the CEO network, CEO compensation committee members will be more 
likely to grant them for other CEOs.   
H6: The presence of outside CEOs on the compensation committee will have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of a CEO having a SERP. 
 Lastly, most research in the area of board and committee effectiveness supports 
the notion that committees are a subset of the board and characteristics of the board 
impact committee effectiveness. One board element that seems to be of particular 
importance to CEO pay is the presence of outside blockholders (Core et al. 1999, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). Blockholders serve as diligent external monitors of 
CEO activity and pay. These studies as well as others show that the presence of outside 
blockholders can serve to limit CEO pay. Executive compensation consistently garners 
much attention from the media and investor groups, and because there has not been a 
plethora of research done in the area of CEO SERPs, most media and investor groups 
seem to view these packages as another form of corporate excess. Alternatively, it is 
possible the blockholders who are not transitory investors may recognize the benefit of 
the CEO having a SERP and acting in the long-term interest of the firm. These investors 
may understand the reduction in agency costs and the related benefits. I do not make a 
directional prediction with this hypothesis due to the competing explanations. 
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H7: The presence of outside blockholders will have an impact on the likelihood of 






The hypotheses are tested using a sample of S&P 500 firms as of 2006. The 
earliest SERP data made available by the new disclosures reports SERP values at the end 
of fiscal year 2006. The sample includes companies in financial industries. The recent 
events surrounding the banking crisis and regulation reform make this industry 
particularly interesting with respect to my study.8 The final sample is constrained by data 
available in Compustat, CRSP, and Execucomp. SERP and severance agreement data is 
hand collected from 2007 company proxy statements that report 2006 values. Table 1 
details lost observations and reports a sample size of 410. Any firms that went through a 
merger or experienced a CEO turnover during 2006 were eliminated from the sample. 
Thirty-seven firms were eliminated because of this constraint. An additional 43 firms 
were dropped from the sample because of missing data from at least one of the primary 
data sources – CRSP, Compustat, and Execucomp. Finally, 10 observations are lost due 
to a lack of information related to the proxy filing. 
The dependent variables used to measure firm risk are two measures of equity risk 
– the standard deviation of daily stock returns and beta. There are other measures of firm 
risk; however, equity risk is the risk that is most directly linked to shareholders. In the 
crafting of executive compensation disclosures by the SEC and executive compensation  
                                                 
8 In an unreported additional sensitivity analysis the financial firms have been dropped. The results remain 




Analysis of Sample 
 
S&P 500 500 
Firms dropped due to merger, CEO turnover, or other  
events during 2006. (37)  
Missing returns data from CRSP, Compustat, and/or Execucomp (43)  
Incomplete or missing data from proxy filings (10) 
Total Sample 410  
CEOs with SERPs 253  
CEOs without SERPs 157  
 
regulations by law makers, it is most often the stockholders with whom they are most 
concerned.9  
Following the approach by Low (2009), the main dependent variable of interest is 
the standard deviation of returns. This is a measure of total firm risk. I measure daily 
returns for a year, calculate the standard deviation, and impose a natural log 
transformation (Low 2009 and Kothari et al. 2009). However, to add rigor to the analysis 
I also calculate Beta using one year of returns and take the natural log.  
Control variables common to both of the dependent variables are used in the 
analysis and are based on prior literature (Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Ryan 1997, and 
Fama and French 1993). The natural log of total assets (LNASSETS) at the end of the 
year controls for size. I measure a one year lag of the market-to-book (MB) ratio to 
control for growth opportunities, while a lag of return-on-assets (ROA) controls for 
                                                 
9 There is debate in the finance and accounting literature as to what type of risk these measures actually 
capture. My paper does not attempt to further parse the differences in these measures. Rather, I employ 
both measures in an attempt to provide rigor to the study. 
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profitability. Leverage (LEV) is total short and long term debt divided by total long and 
short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
Following other research assessing investment policy (Low 2009, Coles et al. 2006, and 
Bargeron et al. 2010), my paper measures research and development expenditures and 
capital expenditures to control for firm risk that may be changing due to investment 
policy. Not all risk is directly related to these accounting measures, but these measures 
help provide evidence of CEOs either accepting or rejecting positive net present value 
projects. Both variables are a three year average of the expenditures. Lastly, to control for 
other elements of compensation that impact CEO decision making, I sum salary and 
bonus over three years and take the average to control for cash compensation 
(CASHCOMP). I use delta to control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity described by 
Core and Guay (2002). I also control for a CEO’s portfolio value sensitivity to stock 
return volatility by measuring VEGA (Core and Guay 2002). I use the variable 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES to measure delta for the combined stock and option 
portfolio. This approach to measuring CEO incentives is quite common in the literature 
(Core and Guay 2002, Coles et al. 2006, and Low 2009). 
The SERP variable is the value of the SERP as of the company’s fiscal year end 
in 2006. The SHELTER variable is a binary variable equal to one if the SERP payment is 
in a lump-sum form upon retirement or the funds used to pay the SERP are set aside in a 
trust. The severance variable is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO has a negotiated 
severance agreement. The conditions, forms, and triggers of severance agreements are 
complex. My paper only begins to investigate the impact of severance agreements on 
risk. Severance agreements generally define different amounts of compensation for 
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differing triggering events: voluntary verses involuntary dismissal, involuntary dismissal 
for cause verses not for cause, etc. For this reason, only one distinction is made as it 
pertains to severance arrangements. The CEO must have a severance agreement beyond 
the scope of a change in control agreement. Change in control agreements are put in place 
to compensate management in the event that the company experiences a merger, 
acquisition, or some other form of combination and the executives are dismissed. Based 
on evidence gathered in proxies, these agreements seem to be fairly universal. The 
severance variable (SEV) in my paper only measures severance agreements above and 
beyond a change-in-control agreement. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the SERP variable and a listing of the 
ten largest SERPs by company and CEO for the sample. Out of 410 sample observations, 
253 CEOs have SERPs. The mean value is $10.5 million with a standard deviation of 
$12.1 million. The largest SERP in the sample is held by Ed Whitacre with AT&T. As of 
the end of 2006 it was worth $84.667 million. While none of the SERPs in my sample are 
as large as Lee Raymond’s SERP from ExxonMobil, it is clear that there are other SERP 
values approaching the $100M threshold.10 
Descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are provided in Table 3. The 
firms are grouped into two groups - CEOs without a SERP and CEOs with a SERP. 
Significant differences in variable means are noted in Panel B of Table 3. Firms with  
                                                 
10 Ed Whitacre does not actually have the largest SERP in the S&P500. William McGuire, United Health 






Descriptive statistics of the SERPs in the sample. All dollar values are in thousands (000). All firms are 
included in the S&P 500. Data comes from 2007 company proxy statements reflecting values as of fiscal 
year end 2006. 
 
 




Std. Dev. 12,100 
Min 67 
Max 84,700 
Rank Company CEO SERP Value 
1 AT&T Edward E. Whitacre, Jr. 84,667 
2 Pfizer Henry McKinnel 82,306 
3 ConocoPhillips J.J. Mulva 58,582 
4 News Corp K. Rupert Murdoch 58,369 
5 AFLAC Inc Daniel P. Amos 49,359 
6 Bank of America Kenneth D. Lewis 49,154 
7 Colgate-Palmolive Reuben Mark 42,858 
8 Textron Inc Lewis B. Campbell 40,084 
9 Prudential Financial Arthur Ryan 36,805 











Descriptive Statistics by SERP Status 
Descriptive statistics by SERP status are presented below for the current sample gathered. The characteristics of firms 
managed by CEOs without SERPs are presented in Panel A. The characteristics of firms managed by CEOs with SERP 
are presented in Panel B. Tests of differences in means between firms with and firms without SERPs are provided in 
Panel B. ***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. BETA is 
calculated using one year of returns. The standard deviation of returns is measured by calculating the standard deviation 
of daily returns for a year. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short 
term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of 
market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a 
three year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash 
plus bonus compensation. PORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA 




Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firms whose CEOs do not have a 
SERP. 
Beta 1.15 1.04 0.54 0.35 2.84 
Std. Dev. Of Ret. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Total Assets (in millions) 25,910.81 8,544.00 82,541.48 810.29 707,121.00 
Leverage 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.84 
Market to Book 4.24 3.28 6.60 0.76 79.73 
ROA 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.26 0.30 
R&D (in millions) 18.86 0.00 85.03 0.00 798.02 
CAPEX (in millions) 675.03 159.39 1,858.35 0.00 15,228.00 
CashComp (in thousands) 1,776.22 1,000.00 3,381.13 0.00 32,208.33 
Portfolio Incentives (in thousands) 5,508.07 955.12 22,917.39 18.10 247,606.40 
Vega 328.13 157.69 489.61 0.00 4,116.72 
Severance 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Firms whose CEOs do have a 
SERP. 
Beta 0.91 *** 0.80 0.50 0.13 3.08 
Std. Dev. Of Ret. 0.01 *** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Total Assets (in millions) 66,579.95 ** 17,067.00 203,511.70 1,497.70 1,884,318.00 
Leverage 0.42 *** 0.37 0.23 0.00 1.12 
Market to Book 2.93 * 2.57 6.76 -61.20 57.63 
ROA 0.06 *** 0.05 0.06 -0.43 0.38 
R&D (in millions) 18.29 0.00 131.00 0.00 1,486.67 
CAPEX (in millions) 925.04 342.67 1,744.36 0.00 14,736.33 
CashComp (in thousands) 1,937.51 1,155.99 2,727.31 637.89 25,683.69 
Portfolio Incentives (in thousands) 1,795.37 ** 832.63 5,840.53 37.90 85,054.37 
Vega 273.66 202.23 290.75 0.00 2,226.05 
Severance 0.64 * 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
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CEOs that have a SERP are larger and more leveraged than those firms whose CEO does 
not have a SERP. Interestingly, market-to-book and ROA are smaller for firms whose 
CEO has a SERP than firms without.   The mean value of portfolio incentives (delta) is 
smaller for CEOs with SERPs indicating that these CEOs receive less performance 
sensitive pay. The difference is statistically significant. The descriptive statistics also 
indicate that CEOs with SERPs are more likely to have a severance agreement. The 
dependent variables also show significant differences between groups. The CEOs with 
SERPs group has a lower mean BETA and a lower mean standard deviation of returns. 
This provides preliminary evidence for hypothesis 1. While differences appear to exist 
between the two groups as it pertains to research and development, capital expenditures,  
cash compensation, and vega these differences are not statistically significant at standard 
levels.  
Pair wise correlations are presented in Table 4. Other than the strong correlation 
between the two measures of firm risk, there does not appear to be any strong correlations 
in the data. This indicates that multicollinearity should not be an issue in the multivariate 

















Correlations are presented below with p-values disclosed below the correlation. Statistically significant correlations are 




 Of Ret. Total Assets Leverage Market to Book ROA  
SERP 1 
BETA -0.1661 1 
0.0006 
Std. Dev. Of Ret. -0.2482 0.8178 1 
0 0 
Total Assets 0.18 -0.1154 -0.218 1 
0.0002 0.0179 0 
Leverage 0.101 -0.2476 -0.279 0.2741 1 
0.0386 0 0 0 
Market to Book -0.0194 0.0454 0.0657 -0.0502 -0.0687 1 
0.6899 0.3537 0.1792 0.3054 0.1612 
ROA -0.0664 0.1118 0.0793 -0.1616 -0.4487 0.5175 1 
0.1707 0.022 0.105 0.0009 0 0 
R&D 0.139 -0.0639 0.016 -0.0124 -0.0569 0.0267 0.0893 
0.0043 0.1905 0.7437 0.8002 0.2445 0.5864 0.0678 
CAPEX 0.2534 -0.0819 -0.1229 0.2587 0.0445 -0.0391 0.033 
0 0.0933 0.0116 0 0.363 0.4243 0.5006 
CASHCOMP 0.1222 -0.0048 -0.0551 0.2622 0.0397 -0.0344 -0.0606 
0.0113 0.921 0.2597 0 0.4174 0.479 0.2113 
PortfolioIncentives -0.0333 -0.015 0.0058 -0.0023 -0.0571 0.1017 0.0796 
0.4968 0.7614 0.9071 0.9621 0.2476 0.0378 0.1045 
TotalVega 0.163 -0.0749 -0.0174 0.0938 -0.083 0.0114 0.1198 
0.0007 0.1226 0.7196 0.053 0.0873 0.8135 0.0128 
SEVERANCE 0.0329 -0.064 -0.006 -0.0865 0.0268 0.014 -0.0475 
0.5016 0.195 0.9037 0.0795 0.5877 0.775 0.3328 
R&D CAPEX CASHCOMP EQUITYCOMP VEGA SEVERANCE 
R&D 1 
CAPEX 0.0038 1 
0.9383 
CASHCOMP -0.0209 0.1627 1 
0.6686 0.0008 
PortfolioIncentives 0.0147 0.01 0.0056 1 
0.7661 0.84 0.9095 
TotalVega 0.1047 0.1741 0.1095 0.1127 1 
0.0307 0.0003 0.0226 0.0194 
SEVERANCE -0.0901 -0.0506 0.0138 -0.117 -0.0623 1 
0.0678 0.3057 0.778 0.0178 0.2054 
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 SERPs and Firm Risk 
 
The focus of the first part of the analysis is the impact of CEO SERP on firm risk 
given differing characteristics of CEO SERPs (tests of hypotheses 1-3). The second part 
of the analysis will test the hypotheses related to the determinants of a SERP (test of 
hypotheses 4-7). Hypothesis 1 is tested to evaluate the overall impact of CEO SERPs on 
firm risk. The second hypothesis is tested to show that the impact of CEO SERPs 
depends upon SERP payment characteristics. The third hypothesis is tested to evaluate 
how a SERP may affect firm risk when the CEO has a severance agreement as well as a 
SERP. To test hypothesis 1 in a multivariate setting, the following OLS regression 
equation is used.11   
RISK = β0 + β1SERP + β2 LNASSETS + β3 LEV + β4MB + β5ROA + β6R&D + 
β7CAPEX + β8CASHCOMP + β9LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β10VEGA + β11SEV 
+ ε                            (1) 
 
RISK  = Standard Deviation of Returns in one model and BETA 
in the other model. 
 
SERP  = A continuous measure of the size of SERP values at the 
end of the 2006 fiscal year. 
 
 LNASSETS   = Natural log of assets at the end of the 2006 fiscal year. 
 
LEV  = Based on Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and measured 
as total debt (short and long term) divided by total debt plus 
book value of equity. 
 
MB    = Market value divided by book value lagged by one year. 
 
ROA    = Net income divided by total assets lagged by one year. 
 
R&D  = Three year average of research and development 
expenditures for t-2, t-1, and t. 
                                                 
11 All regressions throughout the paper are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for industry using Fama 




CAPEX  = Three year average of capital expenditures for t-2, t-1, 
and t. 
 
CASHCOMP  = Three year (2004-2006) average of salary plus bonus 
compensation. 
LNPORTFOLIO 
INCENTIVES = Measure of CEO pay-performance sensitivity. It is 
calculated as the dollar change in CEO stock and option 
portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. 
 
VEGA = Measure of CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. 
It is calculated as the dollar change in CEO option holdings 
for a 1% change in stock return volatility. 
 
SEV  = Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a negotiated 
severance agreement. 
 
 The regression results with only the control variables are shown in columns (1) 
and (3) of Table 5. Size is negatively associated with both measures of risk. Leverage is 
negatively associated with beta. While these findings are expected for size, it is expected 
that leverage would be positively associated with risk. It is possible that this finding is 
idiosyncratic to my sample that includes only the S&P 500 firms. In general, these firms 
are not highly leveraged. It is also possible that stronger and more stable firms have 
higher debt capacities. The market to book ratio is positive in both columns as expected. 
This ratio may indicate growth opportunities and would be positively associated with 
risk. Research and development is positive and significant as expected in the standard 
deviation of returns model. VEGA is positive and significant in the standard deviation of 
returns model. The SEV variable indicating the existence of a severance agreement is 
positive as expected but not significant in either model. 
 The SERP variable is added to the regression and the results are displayed in 




SERP Impact on Firm Risk 
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted 
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were 
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Columns (1) and (3) contain 
the regression with only the control variables. The SERP variable is added to the regression in columns (2) and (4). 
SERP values were collected from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is 
controlled for using Fama and French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is 
measured as total short and long term debt divided by total short and long term debt plus total stockholders’ equity 
following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year 
lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development 
and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation. 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity 
to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package. 
 
Dependent Variables Standard Deviation of Returns Beta 
1 2 3 4 
SERP -0.00004 *** -0.00004 ** 
0.00001 0.00002 
LNASSETS -891.493 *** -780.190 *** -827.864 *** -721.951 *** 
160.318 154.800 259.171 255.866 
LEV -1021.331 -992.675 -2781.535 ** -2754.266 ** 
874.481 855.186 1135.606 1112.880 
MB 59.385 *** 59.939 *** 76.214 *** 76.742 *** 
16.344 16.181 26.298 25.737 
ROA -12154.980 *** -12220.790 *** -9829.521 ** -9892.148 ** 
2583.450 2568.091 4028.877 4015.734 
R&D 2.536 *** 3.104 *** 1.770 2.310 * 
0.921 0.863 1.315 1.256 
CAPEX -0.091 -0.077 0.014 0.027 
0.060 0.066 0.109 0.103 
CASHCOMP -0.030 -0.032 0.031 0.029 
0.031 0.033 0.046 0.049 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES 21.107 76.176 14.730 67.132 
104.871 102.355 147.125 145.963 
VEGA 0.911 *** 0.944 *** 0.213 0.245 
0.341 0.322 0.398 0.400 
SEVERANCE 312.319 363.602 237.470 286.270 
266.627 264.027 383.919 383.635 
Observations 410 410 410 410 
R2 0.594 0.607 0.651 0.656 
 
 
***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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associated with firm risk in both models. This finding is significant at the 1% level in the 
standard deviation of returns model and at the 5% level in the beta model. This provides 
evidence for the theory that CEOs with SERPs manage their firms more conservatively in 
order to ensure that a healthy firm exists upon retirement when the SERP is to be paid. 
This is also evidence of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) prediction that inside debt would 
help to align the incentives of CEOs with debt holders. The control variables in the model 
remain relatively unchanged once the SERP variable is added. 
 The second hypothesis predicts that the negative association between SERPs and 
risk will be reduced when the payment of the SERP is sheltered in some form. To test this 
hypothesis the SHELTER variable is added to the model and interacted with the SERP 
variable. SHELTER is a binary variable that equals 1 when the SERP is sheltered.  
RISK = β0 + β1SERP*SHELTER + β2SERP + β3SHELTER + β4LNASSETS + β5LEV + 
β6MB + β7ROA + β8R&D + β9CAPEX + β10CASHCOMP + 
β11LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β12VEGA + β13SEV+ ε         (2) 
 
The second hypothesis is supported by the results presented in Table 6. The coefficient 
for the interaction term (SERP*SHELTER) is positive and significant at the 1% level and 
5% level for the standard deviation of returns and beta models, respectively. This 
indicates that the SHELTER variable has a positive effect on the association between 
SERP and firm risk. The SERP coefficient remains negative and highly significant 
indicating that the negative relation between SERP and firm risk persists for SERPs 
without SHELTERS. The joint test of SERP + SERP*SHELTER indicates that the 
negative relation between SERPs and firm risk is drastically reduced in the returns model 
(F-test is negative and significant at the 10% level) and eliminated in the beta model (F-




Sheltered SERP Impact on Firm Risk 
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted 
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were 
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected 
from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. SHELTER is a dichotomous variable 
equal to 1 if the SERP is protected by a trust or alternative payment form.  Industry is controlled for using Fama and 
French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. SERP is 
a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term 
debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. 
R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP 
is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package. Only firms with SERPs are included in the regression. 
 
Dependent Variables Standard Deviation  Beta 
of Returns 
SERP_SHELTER 0.0000798 *** 0.000092 ** 
0.000028 0.000044 
SERP -0.000100 *** -0.000107 *** 
0.000026 0.000039 
SHELTER -829.902 -927.818 * 
332.769 501.538 
LNASSETS -754.935 *** -693.651 *** 
151.831 251.551 
LEV -787.443 -2524.615 ** 
849.134 1120.017 
MB 55.945 *** 72.281 *** 
16.724 26.160 
ROA -11850.680 *** -9491.689 ** 
2564.572 4049.565 
R&D 2.809 *** 1.968 
0.835 1.239 
CAPEX -0.087 0.017 
0.063 0.100 
CASHCOMP -0.039 0.022 
0.032 0.049 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES 74.720 65.550 
101.789 146.659 
VEGA 0.906 *** 0.205 
0.315 0.390 
SEV 328.915 244.953 
261.479 379.283 
SERP + SERP_SHELTER -0.00002 * -0.00001 
0.00001 0.00002 
Observations 410 410 
R2 0.617 0.662 
 
***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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not effectively reduce agency costs between CEOs and debt holders if the SERP is 
sheltered. 
 The third hypothesis predicts that the interaction of a SERP and severance 
agreement will attenuate the negative association between SERPs and firm risk. This 
hypothesis is tested using the following model.  
RISK = β0 + β1SERP*SEV + β2SERP + β3 SEV + β4LNASSETS + β5LEV + β6MB + 
β7ROA + β8R&D + β9CAPEX + β10CASHCOMP + β11LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + 
β12VEGA + ε           (3) 
  
The results are disclosed in Table 7. Unfortunately the results do not confirm hypothesis 
3. The interaction term SERP*SEV is not significant. Furthermore, an F-test of the linear 
combination (SERP+SERP*SEV) indicates that coefficient is statistically significant, 
however the coefficient remains negative. This indicates that the severance agreement has 
no impact on the relation between the SERP and firm risk. This is not surprising given 
that in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 SEV, as measured in this paper, does not appear to 
have an association with risk. This may partly explain the lack of results in Table 7. I also 
recognize that measuring severance as a binary variable hinders the power of the SEV 
variable to capture some of the actual characteristics of a severance agreement. Further 
exploration of severance agreements while interesting is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The results of the analyses addressing hypothesis 2 call into question the use of 
SERPs as tools to mitigate agency costs. While there is evidence that SERPs are 
negatively associated with firm risk, this only holds if the SERP is structured like debt. 
The SERP payment must be paid over time in some form of annuity to actually have a 




SERP and Severance Interaction Effect on Firm Risk 
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted 
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were 
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected 
from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for using Fama 
and French industry groups. SEVERANCE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a negotiated severance 
agreement. A joint F-test of the interaction term is displayed below the table. Standard errors are reported in italics. All 
regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. 
Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total 
stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book 
value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of 
research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus 
compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO 
pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package. 
 
Dependent Variables Standard Deviation  Beta 
of Returns 
SERP_SEV -0.0000005 -0.000015 
0.000023 0.000034 
SERP -0.000044 ** -0.000033 
0.000019 0.000026 
SEV 366.921 384.728 
314.343 458.478 
LNASSETS -780.317 *** -725.701 *** 
155.329 256.156 
LEV -992.297 -2743.043 ** 
856.911 1112.487 
MB 59.950 *** 77.055 *** 
16.248 25.825 
ROA -12220.850 *** -9893.838 ** 
2571.763 4018.378 
R&D 3.109 *** 2.449 * 
0.911 1.347 
CAPEX -0.077 0.028 
0.066 0.105 
CASHCOMP -0.032 0.027 
0.033 0.049 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES 76.415 74.230 
102.922 145.659 
VEGA 0.944 *** 0.234 
0.319 0.394 
SERP + SERP_SEV -0.00004 *** -0.00005 ** 
0.00001 0.00002 
Observations 410 410 
R2 0.607 0.657 
 
 
***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Determinants of SERPs 
 
Hypotheses 4-7 predict associations between compensation committee and other 
corporate governance characteristics and SERPs. To test these hypotheses data was 
gathered from proxy statements released at the time the CEO was hired for the same S&P 
firms in the sample. SERP amounts are not like salary or option payments that are 
negotiated or granted on an annual basis. SERP amounts are long-term in nature. While 
minor provisions of the agreements may be amended from year to year, in most cases it is 
likely that the decision to grant a SERP is made at the time a CEO is hired. It is for this 
reason that corporate governance data was collected at the time of hire. This data was 
supplemented with data obtained through Compustat and Execucomp. The following 
probit model is used to test the hypotheses. 
SERPBIN = β0 + β1ANNRET + β2EQUITY + β3CEO + β4BLOCK + β5CEOTENURE + 
β6OUTSIDECEO + β7CEOAGE + β8BOARDSIZE + β9BOARDIND + β10LNASSETS + 
β11LEV + ε           
 (4) 
 
SERPBIN  = A binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO has a SERP 
at the end of the 2006 fiscal year. 
 
ANNRET  = Measures the magnitude of the annual retainer that is 
paid to directors as part of their compensation. 
 
EQUITY  = A binary variable equal to 1 if the directors receive some 
form of equity as part of their compensation. 
 
CEO = Measures the percentage of compensation committee 
members who have experience as a CEO. 
 
BLOCK = Count of the number of blockholders (>5% ownership of 
the firm) within the company. 
 
CEOTENURE = The number of years the CEO has served in that position 




OUTSIDECEO = This is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO was hired 
from outside the firm. 
 
CEOAGE = The 2006 age of the CEO. 
 
BOARDSIZE = The number of directors on the board. 
 
BOARDIND = The percentage of the board members that are 
independent. 
 
 LNASSETS   = Natural log of assets at the end of the 2006 fiscal year. 
 
LEV  = Based on Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and measured 
as total debt (short and long term) divided by total debt plus 
book value of equity. 
 
The first four variables are the variables based on hypotheses 4-7. Based on the 
prediction in hypothesis 4, I expect the coefficient on ANNRET to be positive. EQUITY 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the directors receive some form of equity as part of their 
compensation. No directional prediction is made for this hypothesis. CEO measures the 
percentage of CEOs who sit on the compensation committee. I expect the coefficient for 
this variable to be positive. BLOCK measures the number of blockholders who own 
greater than or equal to 5% of the firm. I do not make a directional prediction for this 
hypothesis. CEOTENURE, OUTSIDECEO, LNASSETS, and LEV are variables taken 
from Sundaram and Yermack’s (2007) determinants of SERP model. All of these 
variables are expected to have positive coefficients. As CEO tenure increases then the 
likelihood of having a form of compensation focused on retirement should also increase. 
Firms may use SERPs to attract potential CEOs to the firm. This is controlled for by 
using an indicator variable if the CEO was hired from outside of the firm. Size and 
leverage have also been found to be positively correlated with the size of the SERP, thus 
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it is possible that these variables are also positively correlated with the existence of a 
SERP. BOARDSIZE, and BOARDIND are other common corporate governance 
variables that have an impact on a firm’s internal corporate governance framework. The 
size of the board also has implications for effective governance (Yermack 1996, Dalton et 
al. 1999). Based on the results found by Conyon and He (2004) it appears that larger 
boards are associated with lower CEO equity incentives. Prior research (Beasley 1996) 
also supports the notion that boards with a greater proportion of independent directors are 
more effective. BOARDIND is measured as the percentage of the board that is composed 
of independent directors.  
 The results of the test are presented in Table 8. The sample size drops from 410 to 
327. Data was gathered from proxy statements at the time of the CEO’s hire. The lost 
observations can be attributed to those CEOs who were hired prior to 1994 as these older 
proxies are very difficult to locate. Additional observations are lost during the estimation 
of the probit model.12 The coefficient for ANNRET is positive as predicted but not 
significant. The EQUITY variable is also not significant. However, the CEO variable 
measuring the percentage of CEOs who serve on the compensation committee is positive 
and significant at the 10% level. This provides evidence for hypothesis 6 that predicts 
that a greater percentage of CEOs on the compensation committee will increase the 
likelihood of having a SERP. This is one of the first findings indicating that the presence 
of CEOs on compensation committee has effect on compensation. Earlier studies have 
failed to find a link between CEO salary and options and CEOs serving on the 
compensation committee.  
                                                 




Determinants of a SERP 
This table presents a cross section of Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of having a SERP by firm. The 
dependent variable SERPBIN is equal to 1 if the CEO has a SERP during the 2006 fiscal year. SERP data were 
collected from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for 
using the Fama and French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ANNRET is dollar amount of the annual retainer paid to directors. EQUITY is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the directors receive any form of equity compensation. CEO measures the percentage of the compensation 
committee composed of CEOs. BLOCK is the number of blockhoders (>5% owners) of the firm. CEOTENURE 
measures the number of years that the CEO has served in his/her current position. OUTSIDECEO equals 1 for a CEO 
who was hired from outside the firm. CEOAGE measures the age of the CEO during 2006. BOARDSIZE measures the 
number of board members who serve on the board. BOARDIND measures the percentage of board members who are 
independent. LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long 
term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007).  
 





















LEVERAGE 1.395 *** 
0.463 
Observations 327 
Pseudo R2 0.287 
 
 




CEOAGE and LEV are both positive and significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. This confirms Sundarum and Yermack’s (2007) results. While the results of 
the determinant model do not provide evidence for all hypotheses, they do indicate that 
CEO service on compensation committees affects pay. 
Endogeneity of SERPs and Firm Risk 
 
There is reason to believe that having a SERP is endogenously determined with 
firm risk. While the focus of my paper is the impact of a SERP on CEO decision making 
and firm risk, risk as a determinant of SERP must be considered. Directors at firms that 
exhibit higher risk characteristics may decide to grant a SERP to a CEO to encourage a 
long-term perspective, reduce agency costs, and moderate excessive risk taking. It is also 
possible that CEOs require additional compensation to accept jobs at excessively risky 
firms due to the loss of reputational capital if unsuccessful, or that boards choose to 
compensate CEOs with SERPs when the firm or industry they are operating in is 
inherently more risky than others. I address these concerns with two additional robustness 
tests, a two-stage least squares (2sls) analysis and a true simultaneous equations analysis. 
Using a standard OLS and ignoring the endogeneity issue will produce biased and 
inconsistent estimators if endogeneity is actually present (Keshk 2003). 
Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis 
 
In the two stage model the endogenous variable SERP is regressed on the 
exogenous variables in the first stage. Then in the second stage the predicted values are 
used as a substitute for the endogenous variable (Keshk 2003). The exogenous variables 
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in the first stage are composed of determinant variables. These variables include 
instrumental variables that are correlated with the endogenous variable (SERP) and 
uncorrelated with the error term. The variables for the first stage model are based on the 
determinant model used to test hypotheses 4-7 in this paper.  
While I do not re-test each hypothesis using 2sls, I have re-tested the first 
hypothesis using this approach. If endogeneity is an issue, it is most likely an issue for the 
test of the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis predicts, and OLS regressions supports, 
that SERPs will be negatively associated with risk. To test this hypothesis in the OLS 
setting I include all firms/CEOs in my sample – those who have SERPs and those who do 
not. The endogenous tension arises in the OLS setting primarily because I may be 
capturing a higher likelihood that “risky” firms choose to grant SERPs to their CEOs.  
 Table 9 presents the results of the 2sls regressions in columns (1) and (3) and the 
results from the original ols regression in columns (2) and (4). The results in columns (2) 
and (4) are copied from Table 5. All regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. The 
coefficients for SERP remain negative in both models and the statistical significance is 
unchanged. The SERP coefficients in the 2sls models for both dependent variables are 
more negative than in the ols model indicating that SERPs have an even greater negative 
association with risk in the 2sls model than was found in the ols model. These results 
corroborate the evidence presented by the ols models and help provide comfort that 
endogeneity is not driving the results. I perform various post-estimation tests to validate 







2SLS Estimation of SERP Impact on Firm Risk 
This table presents the second stage results of a cross section of 2sls regression estimates of the standard deviation of 
returns and equal weighted betas by firm. The ols regression results presented in Table 5 are included in columns (2) 
and (4) for comparability. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for 
using 1 digit SIC codes to avoid collinearity concerns. The dependent variables were multiplied by 104 to improve the 
display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected from company proxy statements 
issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is measured 
as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net 
income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development and 
capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation. 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity 
to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.  
 
Dependent Variables Standard Deviation Beta 
of Returns 
1 2 3 4 
(2sls) (ols) (2sls) (ols) 
SERP -0.00028 *** -0.00004 *** -0.00035 ** -0.00004 ** 
0.00010 0.00001 0.00014 0.00002 
LNASSETS -248.534 -780.190 *** -99.488 -721.951 *** 
341.980 154.800 493.641 255.866 
LEV -1316.028 -992.675 -2015.043 -2754.266 ** 
925.283 855.186 1319.494 1112.880 
MB 32.832 59.939 *** 25.599 76.742 *** 
23.289 16.181 40.340 25.737 
ROA -11414.390 *** -12220.790 *** -10683.030 ** -9892.148 ** 
3372.770 2568.091 5246.166 4015.734 
R&D 4.890 3.104 *** 2.607 2.310 * 
3.465 0.863 5.240 1.256 
CAPEX 0.214 -0.077 0.407 0.027 
0.231 0.066 0.282 0.103 
CASHCOMP -0.098 -0.032 -0.034 0.029 
0.074 0.033 0.114 0.049 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES 241.596 76.176 392.422 67.132 
181.097 102.355 294.047 145.963 
VEGA 0.704 0.944 *** -0.405 0.245 
0.459 0.322 0.675 0.400 
SEV 684.819 363.602 98.908 286.270 
461.605 264.027 686.954 383.635 
Observations 361 401 360 401 
 
 
***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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 As previously mentioned, variables from the determinant model were evaluated as 
potential instrument variables for the 2sls. While five variables (ANNRET, EQUITY, 
CEO, BLOCK, and BOARDSIZE) were evaluated as potential instrument variables, two 
variables were selected as the best instruments – BLOCK and BOARDSIZE. The two 
director compensation variables ANNRET and EQUITY failed to show any correlation 
with the potentially endogenous variable SERP. The remaining variables CEO, BLOCK, 
and BOARDSIZE are all highly significant in the first stage of the model indicating the 
necessary correlation with SERP. The results are qualitatively unchanged using all three 
as instruments. I do not have any reason to believe that the three remaining instruments 
are correlated with the error term; however, post-estimation tests indicate that CEO may 
be related to the error term making the instrument semi-endogenous. Thus, BLOCK and 
BOARDSIZE were used to instrument for SERP. The results of the first stage regression, 
not tabulated, indicate that the two instruments chosen for SERP are highly correlated 
with the SERP. This satisfies the first condition that the instrumental variables be 
correlated with the endogenous variable. Furthermore, the F-statisitic is 14.42. Staiger 
and Stock (1997) believe that an F-statistic below 10 is cause for concern. The F-statistic 
of 14.42 clearly exceeds this threshold. To evaluate the identification of the equation, I 
calculate the Anderson canonical correlation statistic.  I reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% level indicating that the instruments have properly identified the equation (Baum 
2006). I have used two instrumental variables to instrument for my one endogenous 
variable making the equation overidentified.   This allows me to perform an 
overidentification test that will indicate whether or not the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term (Wooldridge 2010). The Hansen J-statistic is calculated to test the 
 
 47
overidentification of all instruments. The null is not rejected with a p-value=.2717 
indicating that that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge 
2010). These tests provide strong evidence that the instruments chosen are sufficient and 
that the model is properly identified. Furthermore, I employed Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimation and found the results qualitatively unchanged. The results 
are not tabulated for the sake of brevity. 
 Although the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changed in the two stage 
model, the direction and significance of the coefficient estimates remains qualitatively 
unchanged. Furthermore, the effect of the SERP on risk in both two stage models was 
larger than in the ols model. It appears that any impact that endogeneity may have on the 
original ols estimates only understates the association between SERPs and risk.  
Simultaneous Equations Analysis 
 
The 2sls estimation discussed above provides consistent estimators; however, 
there is always concern that the estimators are not efficient using 2sls (Larcker and 
Rusticus 2010). To address this concern I employ a simultaneous equations model that 
simultaneously estimates a probit model of SERP and an ols model of firm risk in the 
first stage. The predicted values of each variable (SERP and firm risk) are used as 
explanatory variables in the second stage of the simultaneous equations. The standard 
errors are adjusted in a final stage. This follows the approach by Graham and Rogers 
(2002), Bebchuck et al. (2009), and Fauver and Naranjo (2010). By adjusting the 
standard errors in a final stage, the model produces more efficient estimates than the 2sls 
model. The specific model specification that I am working with requires that SERP be 
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measured as a binary variable in order for the probit model to function correctly. 
SERPBIN equals 1 if the CEO has a SERP and 0 otherwise. My first hypothesis tested 
the association between SERP size (SERP measured as a continuous variable) and firm 
risk. Because I have not yet specifically tested the relation between the existence of a 
SERP and firm risk, I first re-estimate equation one substituting SERPBIN for SERP. 
This allows me to directly compare the results of the simultaneous equations model with 
the ols specification. 
RISK = β0 + β1SERPBIN + β2 LNASSETS + β3 LEV + β4MB + β5ROA + β6R&D + 
β7CAPEX + β8CASHCOMP + β9LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β10VEGA + β11SEV+ 
ε                  (5) 
 
 In Table 10 I only disclose the final result of the simultaneous equations model 
with corrected standard errors in columns (1) and (3). The results from equation (5) using 
SERPBIN as opposed to SERP are disclosed in columns (2) and (4). The coefficient for 
SERPBIN in the standard ols model indicates a negative and significant (at the 1% level) 
relation between having a SERP and firm risk for both firm risk models, consistent with 
prior findings. The simultaneous equations estimates for SERPBIN are also negative and 
significant (at the 1% level). The results of the simultaneous equations model combined 
with the results from the 2sls model provide strong assurance that endogeneity is not 




Simultaneous Equations Estimation of SERP Impact on Firm Risk 
This table presents the final stage results of a cross section of simultaneous equations regression estimates of the 
standard deviation of returns and equal weighted betas by firm in columns (1) and (3), respectively. Columns (2) and 
(4) present ols regression results using SERPBIN for comparability. These dependent variables were estimated for the 
2006 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for using 1 digit SIC codes to avoid collinearity concerns. The dependent 
variables were multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERPBIN 
equals 1 if the CEO has a SERP. This information was collected from company proxy statements issued at the 
beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term 
debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market 
value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three 
year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus 
bonus compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures 
CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.  
 
Dependent Variables Standard Deviation  Beta 
of Returns 





SERPBIN -685.275 *** -1009.714 *** -922.980 *** -1246.244 *** 
164.152 291.523 251.333 438.126 
LNASSETS -738.414 *** -903.151 *** -722.409 *** -925.586 *** 
94.610 153.257 154.817 239.936 
LEV -908.929 ** -1763.446 ** -1255.304 ** -2296.150 ** 
383.061 740.103 620.084 1100.681 
MB 32.915 *** 38.152 * 22.036 16.983 
11.852 21.117 19.047 41.358 
ROA -10637.640 *** -11129.920 *** -9412.620 *** -6624.293 
1315.952 2755.134 2184.815 4554.243 
R&D 1.668 *** 1.728 *** -1.515 * -1.224 
0.501 0.636 0.852 1.437 
CAPEX 0.088 * 0.129 0.244 *** 0.309 ** 
0.046 0.100 0.076 0.129 
CASHCOMP -0.005 -0.034 0.087 0.027 
0.033 0.028 0.054 0.051 
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES -10.524 46.850 82.336 78.827 
55.206 109.010 94.539 173.232 
VEGA 0.384 * 0.500 -0.836 ** -0.527 
0.224 0.332 0.361 0.411 
SEV 191.257 -4.671 -527.285 ** -519.240 
141.502 279.288 233.067 468.914 
Observations 360 410 360 410 
 
 






The challenge still exists for corporations to properly align management 
incentives with stakeholder incentives. Traditionally, maximizing shareholder returns has 
been discussed in the literature. More recently, concern has shifted from understanding 
pay-performance sensitivity to pay-risk sensitivity (SEC 2009). The vast majority of 
compensation research in accounting and finance has focused on annual compensation 
agreements. Annual salaries and equity incentives are very important in determining 
executive incentives; however, CEO SERPs must not be ignored. It is important that we 
understand the effect that these large SERPs have on firm risk. 
 My paper provides evidence that certain SERPs are negatively associated with 
firm risk and may reduce the agency costs of debt. However, if these SERP payments are 
sheltered by the firm then the negative association with risk is greatly reduced and even 
eliminated in some specifications. These findings are limited to the largest public 
companies in the US and may not be generalizable to all public companies. Future 
research will be required to make this determination. 
 As regulators, investors, and others in society debate the form, size, and structure 
of executive compensation these findings should be considered. While large in size, if 
structured correctly SERPs may help curb the excessive risk taking that many 
stakeholders believe to be an issue in the current economy. If the SERP arrangements are 
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Rights of Withdrawal 
 
 Because SERPs are subject to the volatility of the firm and are not protected by 
the same provisions as other retirement accounts, a CEO may maximize expected wealth 
by protecting the SERP. There are three basic levels of securing payment of the SERP. 
The first way to increase the security of payment is by defining rights of withdrawal. 
CEOs and companies may negotiate conditions that would give rise to an early 
withdrawal. To avoid immediate taxation, the early withdrawal clause must include a 
triggering event. Otherwise the CEO would be subject to taxation even before any 
withdrawal. A common form of the right of withdrawal is change of control agreement. 
The majority of CEOs have agreements in place that guarantee certain payments if their 
firm experiences a change of control.13 
 Rabbi Trust 
 
The second layer of security for the SERP is securing the assets through a trust 
such as a Rabbi Trust. A company could contribute funds to the trust to be used for the 
sole purpose of funding the SERP. For the CEO to avoid immediate taxation on the 
amounts contributed to the trust, the trust must be available to the company’s creditors in 
the event of bankruptcy. 
                                                 
13 A change of control is defined as an event where a transfer of firm ownership occurs in which a person, 
group, or other entity obtains a fifty percent or more ownership stake in the firm. Executive compensation 
and severance agreements are generally written to provide compensation for an executive who is 





 The third layer of security as described by Kennedy for a SERP is a secular trust. 
A secular trust is a fully funded trust that is not available to the company’s creditors in 
the event of bankruptcy. This type of agreement creates a fully funded pension for the 
executive. This creates an immediate tax liability for the CEO; however, in some 
instances CEO pay is grossed up for the amount of the tax liability (Gerakos 2007). This 











 Colin D. Reid was born in Dallas, Texas. He attended school at Scofield Christian 
School in Dallas, Texas, Gallatin Gateway School in Gallatin Gateway, Montana, and 
Trinity Fellowship Christian School in Amarillo, Texas where he graduated from high 
school in 2000. He attended Baylor University from 2000-2005 receiving Bachelor in 
Business Administration and Master of Accounting degrees in May 2005. He graduated 
magna cum laude. Colin worked as an audit associate for PricewaterhouseCoopers in 
Dallas, Texas from 2005-2007 before deciding to return to school to pursue his doctorate. 
He began his doctoral studies in 2007 at the University of Tennessee. Colin graduated in 
May 2011 with a Doctor of Philosophy degree. He accepted a position as an assistant 
professor at Northeastern University. 
